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I. INTRODUCTION: TOBACCO, TRADEMARKS AND SPEECH
In his famous Harvard Law Review article that gave birth to trademark
dilution law, Frank Schechter argued that the only rational basis for trademark
protection was to protect the "true functions of the trademark," which was not
just source identification, but also the ability of a mark "to stimulate further
purchases by the consuming public."' Schechter bluntly and correctly observed
that "[t]he mark actually sells the goods."2 The "selling power" of trademarks,
according to Schechter, was the result of the "psychological hold" that the mark
had on the consuming public.3 Later, Justice Frankfurter similarly elucidated the
psychological function of trademarks.4 He explained that the owner of a mark
"exploits" the human propensity to have desires induced by impregnating the
atmosphere of the market with "the drawing power" of the brand.5 He called this
"the commercial magnetism" of trademarks.6
The commercial magnetism of trademarks is now universally accepted
and must no longer be explained in law review articles or Supreme Court
opinions. Marketers completely understand brand attractiveness and brand
loyalty and how to fully exploit that human propensity. Intellectual property
lawyers also understand brand value, which in many cases represents the most
valuable asset of a company. For example, MARLBORO is currently one of the
world's most valuable brands, valued at $19.7 billion.' This valuation is just one
way of illustrating the "psychological hold" the brand has on our collective
psyche.' But as the population of smokers is diminishing and the regulation of
1 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV.
813, 818, (1927).
2 Id. at 819.
3 Id. at 831.




7 The World's Most Valuable Brands: 2015 Ranking, FORBEs, http://www.forbes
.com/powerful-brands/list/#tab:rank (last visited June, 2, 2015).
8 See Paul Hague, Measuring Brand Value-How Much Are Brands Worth?, B2B
INTL., https://www.b2bintemational.com/publications/value-of-brands/ (last
visited May 16, 2015) (differentiating between goodwill and brand valuation
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tobacco is increasing, Marlboro, like other tobacco brands, is a brand whose
considerable value is presently in decline.9
Examining the speech surrounding tobacco products provides a good
vehicle to explore the intersection of First Amendment law and trademark law.
Tobacco products speak to consumers through their advertising and packaging.
The government speaks to the public about the public health dangers of tobacco
through this same medium. And the public, who wants to speak about both how
tobacco products are marketed as well as their harmful health effects, may speak
to each other through the use of tobacco brands.
These highly-contested speech interests pit First Amendment law against
government regulation, and trademark law against First Amendment law. The
government would like to regulate what obacco firms say in their advertising
and on their packaging, while tobacco firms would like to control what others
say about them through their trademarks. Tobacco firms argue strenuously for
robust First Amendment rights when challenging government regulations, and
then seek to suppress others' assertion of speech rights by using their assertion of
trademark rights as a sword. When these disputes are examined side-by-side, we
see that strong speech rights emerge from clear doctrine in the tobacco regulation
cases, but that speech rights are vulnerable in the disorderly doctrine that has
emerged in the trademark speech cases.
This article will first examine the conflict between First Amendment and
trademark doctrines surrounding the regulation of the marketing of tobacco
products. It will then present the presence of this same conflict in private
litigation over the noncommercial use of trademarks. In conclusion, the article
will posit that the two bodies of law, as they currently exist, present an untenable
contradiction that needs to be resolved.
as ways of determining the premium that consumers will pay for a brand
above a base line).
9 Richard Gallagher, Industry Analysis: Tobacco, VALUE LINE,
http://www.valueline.com/Stocks/Industries/IndustryAnalysisTobacco.as
px#.VP6MboHF-Hw (last visited May 15, 2015) (stating that concerns
regarding the health effect of consuming tobacco and increased government
regulation have led to a steady decline in demand in the developed world).
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT AND TRADEMARK CHALLENGES TO THE REGULATION
OF THE MARKETING OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS
To examine the extent to which the government can regulate the
marketing of tobacco products under the First Amendment and trademark
doctrine, this section will consider hypothetical Plain Packaging legislation
similar to that which has been adopted in Australia. It will discuss the level of
First Amendment scrutiny that is used to determine whether a governmental
regulation is constitutional before applying this scrutiny to the Plain Packaging
legislation to determine whether it could withstand a constitutional challenge.
This section will then consider the scrutiny applied to misleading speech under
trademark doctrine and demonstrate how trademark owners obtain injunctions
that escape stricter, First Amendment scrutiny, to prohibit the unauthorized
commercial use of their marks.
A. Trademarks and Plain Packaging Legislation
For fifty years, governments have sought to curb smoking due to its
hideous health consequences for both smokers and non-smokers.10 Tobacco is the
"leading global cause of preventable death."" In addition to resolving a major
health problem, governmental action is also compelled by the severe
combination of these two facts: cigarettes are addictive and the large majority of
smokers start as minors.12 As the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids points out,
"[tiobacco is the only legal product sold in the United States that, when used
1o In 1964, the Surgeon General issued a report on smoking and health saying
that tobacco causes lung cancer. Advisory Comm. to the Surgeon Gen. of the
Pub. Health Serv., U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., and Welfare, Pub. No. 1103,
Smoking and Health (1964). Subsequently, in 1965, the U.S. Congress passed
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, which required a health
warning on all cigarette packs. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (2012).
11 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO
EPIDEMIC, 2011: WARNING ABOUT THE DANGERS OF TOBACCO 8 (2011), available
at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789240687813-eng.pdf?ua=1.
12 Child and Teen Tobacco Use, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, http://www.cancer
.org/acs/groups/cid/documents/webcontent/002963-pdf.pdf (last visited May
15, 2015) ("Nearly 9 of 10 adult smokers had their first smoke by age 18.").
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according to the manufacturer's instructions, is highly addictive and kills a high
percentage of its regular users.""
In addition to heavily taxing tobacco products, Congress has attempted
to curb smoking in three main areas: smoking in public places, cigarette
advertising, and the appearance of cigarette packaging.14 Since 1965, health
warnings have been mandated on all cigarette packaging.15 These warnings have
grown in size and severity and have become more graphic over the years.16 The
most recent attempt to curb smoking also impacts the packaging and restricts
how tobacco brands appear on cigarette packages. These so-called "plain
packaging" measures are the latest in a long line of tobacco control regulations.
Since the implementation of the World Health Organization's (WHO)
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2005,17 a number of
countries have explored the idea of adopting plain packaging for tobacco
13 See Why the FDA Should Regulate Tobacco Products, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO
FREE KIDS, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0030.pdf
(last visited May 15, 2015).
14 See, e.g., Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012)
(banning the advertising of cigarettes on any medium of electronic
communication); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-33 (2012) (requiring all cigarette
packages to carry health warnings); Cal. Lab. Code § 6404.5 (West 2003)
(prohibiting smoking in most California workplaces).
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-33 (The Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act was
passed in 1965, and became effective in 1966.).
16 Niall McCarthy, The Rapid Rise of Graphic Warnings on Cigarette Packages,
FORBES (Dec. 1, 2014, 8:06 AM), available at http://www.forbes.com/
sites/niallmccarthy/2014/12/01/the-rapid-rise-of-graphic-warnings-on-
cigarette-packages-infographic/.
17 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
TOBACCO CONTROL (2005) [hereinafter FCTC], available at http://whqlibdoc
.who.int/publications/2003/9241591013.pdf?ua=1. The FCTC is a WHO
treaty, adopted under article 19 of the WHO Constitution at the 56th World
Health Assembly on May 21, 2003. The objective of this treaty is "to protect
present and future generations from the devastating health, social,
environmental and economic consequences of tobacco consumption and
exposure to tobacco smoke" by adopting a regulatory strategy to reduce the
demand and supply of tobacco products. Id. at 5. As the name suggests, the
treaty is merely a framework and it is up to the signing members to ratify
and implement it in good faith.
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products as a means of reducing the demand for tobacco.'8 To date, Australia's
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act of 201119 is the most ambitious implementation of
the FCTC framework. A number of other countries are contemplating similar
regulations using the Australian legislation as a model. Ireland and the United
Kingdom have recently passed legislation modeled on the Australian Act.20
Efforts to introduce plain packaging legislation are also underfoot in Canada,21
Turkey,22 Norway,23 and France.24 Broad adoption of such legislation will no
18 Reducing the Appeal of Smoking-First Experiences with Australia's Plain
Packaging Law, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (May 2013),
http://www.who.int/features/2013/australia-tobacco-packaging/en/ (stating
that New Zealand, India, France, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the
European Union are considering plain packaging legislation for tobacco
products).
19 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.).
20 Lincoln Feast, Australia at Odds with Cigarette Makers over Plain Packaging
Impact, REUTERS (July 22, 2013, 7:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2013/07/22/us-australia-tobacco-packaging-idUSBRE96LODY20130722;
Patrick Wintour, England to Introduce Plain Cigarette Packaging Before Next
Election, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2015, 2:40 AM), http://www.theguardian
.com/society/2015/jan/21/plain-cigarette-packs-general-election-tobacco;
Nick Miller, As Europe Adopts Australia's Plain Packaging Reforms, Big Tobacco
Fights Back, SIDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.smh
.com.au/world/as-europe-adopts-australias-plain-packaging-reforms-big-
tobacco-fights-back-20150321-lm3bwk.htm.
21 Carly Weeks, Canada's Cigarette Warning Labels Could Still Go Further, Report
Finds, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Nov. 14, 2012, 3:00 AM),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/health-and-fitness/health/canadas-
cigarette-warning-labels-could-still-go-further-report-finds/article5253202.
22 Benjamin Harvey, Turkey Working on Cigarette Branding Ban Law, Milliyet
Says, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Sept. 7, 2011, 1:45 AM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2011-09-07/turkey-working-on-cigarette-branding-ban-
law-milliyet-says.
2 Miller, supra note 20.
24 Ruth Bender, France Mulls Plain Packaging Law for Cigarettes, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 25, 2014, 3:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/france-mulls-plain-
packaging-law-for-cigarettes-1411664017; see also Solveig Godeluck et al.,
Tabac: le Paquet de Cigarettes "Neutre" Sans Logo Bient6t en France [Tobacco:
"Neutral" Pack of Cigarettes Without Logo Soon in France], LEsEcHOs.FR
(Sep. 23, 2014, 8:30 PM), http://www.lesechos.fr/23/09/2014/lesechos.fr/
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doubt mean that the conflict between speech liberties and trademarks will be
present for years to come.
Plain packaging laws are the next generation of efforts to curb tobacco
use. In addition to assisting Australia to comply with its obligations under the
FCTC, the Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging Act has three objectives: 1) to
reduce the appeal of tobacco products to consumers; 2) to increase the
effectiveness of health warnings on the retail packaging of tobacco products; and
3) to reduce the ability of the retail packaging of tobacco products to mislead
consumers about the harmful effects of tobacco products.25
This legislative effort is called "plain packaging" because it seeks to
make the health warnings more prominent by making the packaging otherwise
plain.2 6 Brand information, which trademark lawyers know to be, so
commercially magnetic, is significantly downplayed on the packaging.27 For
instance, the Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging Act requires tobacco products
to be sold in logo-free packaging (see Figure 1).28 No non-word signs of any kind
can be used other than a limited number of prescribed signs.29 According to the
Act, word trademarks are permitted, but they are limited to a particular font size
and type and restricted as to the space on the packaging that they can occupy.3o
The color of the word trademarks is also prescribed.3' In addition, large text and
0203800487736_tabac---le-paquet-de-cigarettes--neutre--sans-logo-bientot-
en-france.htm#.
25 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) ch 1 pt 1 sec 3 (Austl.).
26 See Trefis Team, Philip Morris Braces for Ireland's Tobacco Plain Packaging
Legislation, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2014, 1:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
greatspeculations/2014/10/08/philip-morris-braces-for-irelands-tobacco-
plain-packaging-legislation/ (suggesting that he legislation is intended to
turn away adolescents from smoking).
27 Id. (summarizing how plain packaging laws aim is to remove "attractive
packaging," presumably speaking towards tobacco products' trademarks
and trade dress).
2 See Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) ch 2 pt 2 (Austl.) (outlining the
requirements for retail packaging of tobacco products and for appearances
of tobacco products).
29 Tobacco Plain Packaging Regulations 2011 (Cth) reg 2.3.1 (Austl.).
0 Tobacco Plain Packaging Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 2.4.2(2) (Austl.).
3 Tobacco Plain Packaging Regulations 2011 (Cth) ch 2 pt 2 div 1 s 19 (Austl.).
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graphic warnings about smoking must cover ninety percent of the back of the
packaging and seventy-five percent of the front of the packaging.32
I I I DON'T LETSMKN CAUSES W CHILOREN BRE,
*.YOR SMO
Figure 1: Cigarette Cartons under Australia's Plain Packaging Act
The legislation also provides that the opportunity to obtain registration
of tobacco trademarks is not lost as a consequence of the legislation.3 3 Usually, an
applicant for registration is required to have an intention to use a trademark.
34 In
the case of tobacco trademarks, the owner will not be able to use the stylized or
logo mark on the product.35 And to the extent the packaging amounts to trade
dress, those marks will also not be used.36 The Australian law creates an
exception for tobacco trademarks and does not disqualify them from
registration.37 In addition, trademarks that are not used because of the legislation
are immune from cancellation of their registration for non-use.38
32 Competition and Consumer (Tobacco) Information Standard 2021 (Cth) pt 9 div 4
sub-div 1 s 9.13(1), sub-div 2 s 9.19(1)(b) (Austl.).
33 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) ch 2 pt 2 div 3 s 28(3) (Austl.).
3 Id. at ch 2 pt 2 div 3 s 28(1)(a) (Austl.).
3 Id. at ch 2 pt 2 div 1 s 20 (Austl.).
3 Id.
3 Id. at ch 2 pt 2 div 3 s 28(3) (Austl.).
38 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) ch 2 pt 2 div 3 s 28(3) (Austl.).
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This legislation has been challenged in a pending World Trade
Organization (WTO) dispute that has been brought against Australia by a
number of countries that are tobacco exporters: Cuba, Ukraine, the Dominican
Republic, Indonesia, and Honduras (the "Complainants").39 Ukraine has since
suspended its legal proceedings.40 The Complainants are arguing that the
promulgation of the Plain Packaging Act is a violation of Australia's
international trade obligations under the WTO agreements.41 The number of
39 Australia-Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases_e/ds434
e.htm (last visited May 15, 2015) [hereinafter Ukraine-Australia Plain
Packaging Dispute Summary] (summarizing the dispute from its
commencement in May 2012 to the present day); Tania Voon & Andrew
Mitchell, Australia's Plain Tobacco Packaging Law at the V/TO, THE
CONVERSATION (May 15, 2013, 12:36 AM), http://theconversation.com/
australias-plain-tobacco-packaging-law-at-the-wto-14043. The Complainants
allege that Australia's measures, especially when viewed in the context of
Australia's comprehensive tobacco regulatory regime, appear to be
inconsistent with Articles 1, 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 15, 16, 20 and 27 of the TRIPS
Agreement, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
4o Australia- Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging: Communication from




41 Jaan Murphy, Australia's WTO Plain Cigarette Packaging Case: An Update,
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, http://www.aph.gov.au/AboutParliament/
Parliamentary_.Departments/ParliamentaryLibrary/FlagPost/2014/July/WT
O plainscigarette-packaging-case (last visited May 15, 2015) (outlining that
Complainants are arguing that Australia breached the WTO General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade ("TBT") agreements as the Plain Packaging Act treats
imported tobacco products less favorably than domestic ones; creates
unnecessary obstacles to trade and is more restrictive than is necessary to
achieve a legitimate objective; and does not provide effective protection
against unfair competition to nationals of other countries. Complainants also
find a violation of the Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS") and the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property as due to the Plain Packaging legislation, and state that
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WTO members who are a part of the dispute as third parties makes this the
biggest and most wide-reaching dispute to date under the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS").4 2 This legislation is
also the subject of a lawsuit in the U.K., where British American Tobacco and
Philip Morris is arguing that the law violates E.U. trademark law,43 and an
investor-state arbitration proceeding, where Phillip Morris Asia is challenging
the plain packaging regulations under the 1993 Agreement between the
Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments.4 The tobacco company's argument purports that
the plain packaging regulations are an expropriation of Phillip Morris'
Australian investments and a breach of the agreement to accord fair and
equitable treatment to the company's investments, as the regulations subject
these investments to an unreasonable and discriminatory measure, depriving
them of full protection and security.45
The main challenge to the law is that it impermissibly interferes with
trademark owners' rights under the TRIPS Agreement. The Complainants
contend that the TRIPS Agreement constrains the extent to which a WTO
member state may regulate the trademark owner's ability to use their mark.46 The
Australia fails to protect trademarks registered intemally "as is," which
places unjustified barriers on the use of tobacco trade-marks and effectively
denies or invalidates the registration of tobacco trademarks).
42 Guatemala, Norway, Uruguay, Brazil, Canada, the European Union,
New Zealand and Nicaragua have all requested to join the consultations. In
addition, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, the European Union, Guatemala, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Malawi, Mexico, Moldova, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Peru, the Philippines,
Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand Turkey, the United States, Uruguay,
Zambia and Zimbabwe have reserved their third party rights. See Ukraine-
Australia Plain Packaging Dispute Summary, supra note 39, at 1.
43 Tobacco Firms Challenge Plain Packaging Law, BBC NEWS (May 22, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32843205.
4 See Tobacco Plain Packaging-Investor-State Arbitration, AUSTRALIAN Gov'T
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEP'T, http://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging
(last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
45 Id.
46 Request for Consultations by Cuba, Australia -Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS458/1 (May 7, 2013);
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Complainants argue that the TRIPS Agreement, in Article 20, obligates member
states to protect trademark owners' affirmative right to use their trademarks, as
that article provides that use of a mark cannot be "unjustifiably encumbered" in
a way that would, among other things, impair the mark's ability to distinguish a
product and serve as a source identifier.47 Tobacco trademark owners claim that
because Australia's legislation prohibits the use of any stylization or design and
reduces the space occupied by the mark, their ability to indicate the source of
origin of their product and distinguish their product from others-the two basic
functions of trademarks-are impaired. 48
While no similar legislation is pending in the U.S., the legislation and the
challenges it faces pose an interesting question about how such legislation would
interact with both U.S. trademark law and First Amendment doctrines. This
article will next address the First Amendment scrutiny that is applied to the
regulation of commercial speech, such as the packaging on tobacco packets, and
how such legislation, if proposed, would fare under U.S. law. The article will
Request for Consultations by the Dominican Republic, Australia -Certain
Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain
Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging,
WT/DS441/1 (July 23, 2012); Request for Consultations by Honduras,
Australia -Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications
and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging, WT/DS435/1 (Apr. 10, 2012); Request for Consultations by
Ukraine, Australia - Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging, WT/DS434/1 (Mar. 15, 2012).
4 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 20 ("The use of a trademark in the
course of trade shall not be unjustifiably encumbered by special
requirements, such as use with another trademark, use in a special form or
use in a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish the goods or
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings. This will not
preclude a requirement prescribing the use of the trademark identifying the
undertaking producing the goods or services along with, but without
linking it to, the trademark distinguishing the specific goods or services in
question of that undertaking.").
4 Emma Jones, Plain Packaging: The New IP Battleground?, PRIMARY OPINION,
http://blog.primaryopinion.com/plain-packaging-the-new-ip-battleground/
(last visited May 15, 2015) (stating that the introduction of plain packaging
legislation will lead to consumer confusion of both quality and origin of the
goods).
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then examine the level of scrutiny applied to misleading speech under trademark
law and the consequences of this lighter level of scrutiny.
B. The First Amendment Analysis of Governmental Regulation of
the Marketing of Tobacco Products
This section of the article will first discuss the appropriate level of First
Amendment scrutiny applicable to regulations that monitor tobacco advertising,
notably the content of tobacco packaging. It will then apply this level of scrutiny
to a hypothetical plain packaging act that is identical to the Australian
legislation.
1. Central Hudson and Intermediate First Amendment
Scrutiny for the Regulation of Commercial Speech
Any governmental regulation of the marketing of tobacco products
along the lines of a plain packaging law would certainly face a First Amendment
challenge because plain packaging legislation impinges on a trademark owner's,
and presumably a business owner's, ability to speak to consumers about their
product. The use of trademarks on cigarette packages would be considered
speech, but it would be considered commercial speech since it proposes a
commercial transaction by identifying and distinguishing the source of
commercial goods.49 The Supreme Court first extended First Amendment
protections to commercial speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. because it recognized the informational value of
commercial speech to the consuming public.so The Court recognized, however,
that some regulations on commercial speech were necessary and constitutionally
permissible so that the "the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as
well as freely." 51 Regulations that target false and misleading commercial speech;
false advertising; as well as regulations on the time, manner, and place of
commercial speech are not automatically prohibited by the First Amendment.52
49 See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 31:141 (4th ed. 2015); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First
Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381, 395-96 (2008)
(stating that the use of a trademark in commercial advertising and
packaging for a specific commercial product is "pure commercial speech").
5o 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976).
51 Id. at 771-72.
52 Id. at 771.
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The test for determining whether a regulation on commercial speech
violates the First Amendment was provided by the Supreme Court four years
after Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission.3 Central Hudson establishes an intermediate level of
scrutiny for the regulation of commercial speech.M Thus, the government may
regulate truthful, non-misleading commercial speech about lawful activity if 1)
the regulation serves a substantial government interest, 2) the regulation directly
advances the stated interest, and 3) the regulation is no more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest.55
Under this framework, false or misleading speech never receives First
Amendment constitutional protections. Courts, however, only recognize
commercial speech as misleading speech when it is actually or inherently
misleading, not merely potentially misleading.5 Commercial speech is "actually"
misleading when the record contains actual evidence of deception," and it is
considered "inherently" misleading when the speech is disseminated in a
manner that is "inherently conducive to deception and coercion."" This same
high standard of proof is echoed in the other prongs of the Central Hudson test:
the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the harms it recites are
real and that the proposed regulation will in fact alleviate those harms to a
material degree.59
2. Application of Central Hudson to Plain Packaging
Legislation
An application of Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny test to our
theoretical Plain Packaging Act could result in a finding of unconstitutionality.
While it is likely that the legislation should survive an examination under the
5 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
5 See id. at 566.
ss Id.
5 See, e.g., Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'1 Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146
(1994).
5 Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 106
(1990).
5 Id. at 112 (Marshall, J., concurring).
5 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
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first two prongs of the Central Hudson test,60 it may be more difficult to prove that
it directly advances the government's stated interest and that it is no more
extensive than necessary to accomplish the stated goals.
First, it is likely that courts will find that the use of tobacco trademarks
in their usual form and usual manner on cigarette packages is not false or
misleading. The trademark likely will have been registered by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"), and federal law already prohibits the
false advertising of tobacco products. Moreover, the USPTO examines
trademarks for the purposes of registration and will not register marks if they are
either descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive under section 2 of the Lanham
Act.61 Although it is possible for the USPTO to grant a registration in error,
registrations for marks that are deceptive may be opposed or cancelled.62 And,
although a cigarette manufacturer may use an unregistered mark on its package,
this is both unlikely and risky because an infringer would certainly argue that
such a mark would be invalid and unenforceable.63 In addition to trademark law,
60 447 U.S. at 566. Some examples of illegal, misleading commercial speech are
stating falsely that a product has received a testimonial from a respected
source or stating falsely that a product has been "certified." See F.T.C. v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 389 (1965). There is nothing conveyed
in trademarks or trade dress of tobacco products that convey something
inherently deceptive or misleading. The regulation clearly serves the
governmental interest to reduce the population of smokers and increase
awareness of its detrimental health effects. The government regulation,
however, is most likely not reasonably tailored to this goal. See Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1995). In Rubin, the Court rejected
legislation that prohibited beer labels from displaying their alcohol content
because it was more extensive than necessary to accomplish the stated
governmental interest, especially in light of the fact that there were less
restrictive alternatives that accomplished this goal. See id. Here, because
there are less restrictive alternatives that could accomplish the stated
government interest of raising awareness of smoking's health effects, it
would most likely fail the Central Hudson test.
61 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e) (2006).
62 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063-4..
63 Registration on the Principal Register provides crucial benefits, including
the benefit of a statutory presumption that the mark is valid and has
secondary meaning. See Andrew Stockment, Trademarks 101 Part 2: The
Benefits of Federal Registration, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: YOUNG LAWYERS
DIViIoN, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/younglawyers/publications/
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the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the packaging and labeling
of tobacco products and their truthfulness.M Pursuant to the 2009 Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, the FDA can specifically prohibit
the marketing of tobacco products with descriptors that have the potential of
misleading consumers as to the health effects of consuming tobacco products
(such as "light," "mild," or "low").65
Current First Amendment doctrine does not have a threshold level for
what percentage of consumers must be deceived in order to find actual
deception.66 But consumers are already aware of the health risks associated with
smoking. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1333, cigarette manufacturers are already required to
label their packages with one of a selected number of warnings addressing the
harmful effects of smoking.67
Next, the government must demonstrate that the regulation serves a
substantial or compelling government interest. There is likely to be little
argument that reducing the appeal of tobacco products to consumers and
improving the effectiveness of health warnings on tobacco products is a
substantial government interest.68 The generally-recognized harmful effects of
the_101_201_practice series/trademarks_101_part_2_the b nefits of federal
.registration.html (last visited May 15, 2015).
6 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg.
44,399-400 (Aug. 28, 1996) (stating that the Rule prohibits the sale of tobacco
products to minors and requires manufacturers to comply with certain
conditions regarding the advertising of their products and that as the FDA
has determined that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are a combination of a
drug and a device they may be regulated under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act's drug authorities, device authorities, or both).
65 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, and 21 U.S.C.).
6 See Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S. C.
L. REV. 737, 748-49 (2007).
67 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2012).
68 See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. TO THE SURGEON GEN. OF THE PUB. HEALTH SERV.,
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, PUB. No. 1103, Smoking and
Health, 33 (1964) ("Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient
importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.");
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,399
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smoking69 should satisfy the government's burden of demonstrating that the
harms it recites are real. This argument is similar to Australia's argument in the
WTO dispute.70 Cigarette advertising and packaging is a powerful way for
tobacco companies to market their products to young audiences. Research on
smoking suggests that if people do not start smoking at a young age, they will
forgo smoking their entire lives.7' Accordingly, plain packaging is a powerful,
preemptive deterrent because it interferes with brand image. Plain packaging
will cause tobacco products to lose their cachet, and appealing packages will
become dull and uninteresting.72 In this respect, the branding on packages is
analogous to tobacco advertising and as such ought to be regulated in a similar
manner.
The government may also be able to demonstrate that the Plain
Packaging Act directly advances its stated interests of reducing the appeal of
tobacco products, improving the effectiveness of health warnings on tobacco
products, and reducing the ability of cigarette manufacturers to mislead the
public about the harmful effects of tobacco products. At least one tobacco
company has acknowledged that it uses its packaging to promote the products of
one cigarette manufacturer over another and to differentiate its products from
that of competitors.7' Furthermore, a number of studies have demonstrated that
(Aug. 28, 1996) (affirming that the purpose of these regulations was to
substantially reduce the number of children and adolescents who begin
using tobacco, and therefore, reduce tobacco-related illness).
69 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Effects of Smoking on Your
Health, BETOBACCOFREE.GOV, http://betobaccofree.hhs.gov/health-effects/
smoking-health/ (last visited May 15, 2015).
70 See Murphy, supra note 41 (stating that one of Australia's counter arguments
to the Complainants in the WTO case is that the plain packaging legislation
is a necessary measure designed to pursue the legitimate objective of the
protection of human health).
7' Child and Teen Tobacco Use, supra note 12.
72 Michelle Innis, Australia's Graphic Cigarette Pack Warnings Appear to Work,
N.Y. TIMEs (June 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/business/
international/australias-graphic-cigarette-pack-warnings-appear-to-
work.html (quoting the New Zealand associate health minister regarding
how plain packaging "takes away the last means of promoting tobacco as a
desirable product").
73 Mark Davison & Patrick Emerton, Rights Privileges, Legitimate Interests, and
Justifiability: Article 20 of TRIPS and Plain Packaging of Tobacco, 29 AM. U. INT'L.
L. REv. 505, 567 (2014).
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the plain packaging of cigarettes provokes a decrease in the appeal of the
product, as plain packages were found to be associated with lower quality
cigarettes, which project a less desirable smoker identity and further expose the
harmful effects of smoking.4 A majority of the studies researching the
effectiveness of plain packaging in highlighting the warnings on cigarette
packages found that plain packaging increased the salience of warnings on
cigarette packages for two reasons: first, there was less clutter on the packages to
detract from the warnings; and second, the dullness and seriousness of the
packages themselves increased the gravity of the warnings and consequences of
smoking."
All of these findings are generally in line with the FCTC proposition that
plain packaging reduces the appeal of cigarette products, increases the
effectiveness of health warnings on packaging, and reduces consumer confusion
about the comparative level of harm provoked by one cigarette brand over
another.76 To date, over 168 nations have signed the FCTC, signaling a
widespread, international recognition of the FCTC propositions.77
Despite all the evidence pointing toward the ability of plain packaging to
achieve its stated goals, whether or not plain packaging can actually reduce the
number of smokers is still contested.78 Australia's experience with plain
packaging legislation, after a period of time, may provide the evidence that could
7 Crawford Moodie et al., Plain Tobacco Packaging: A Systematic Review, UNIv.
STIRLING 1, 84-85 (2012), http://phrc.1shtm.ac.uk/papers/PHRC_006_Final
Report.pdf (providing a comprehensive summary of the major studies
addressing the effects of plain packaging of cigarettes).
75 Id. at 85-86.
76 See id. at 84.
n Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL,
http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories-parties/en/ index.html (last updated
Feb. 12, 2015) (stating that there are 180 parties to the WHO FCTC and 168
signatories). The U.S. has not yet ratified the convention.
78 See, e.g., No Evidence That Plain Cigarette Packs Work, Says Industry Funded
Study, NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (NHS), http://www.nhs.uk/news/2014/
03March/Pages/Plain-fags-packs-dont-work-says-industry-funded-
study.aspx (last visited May 15, 2015) (providing a study that showed that
the long-term trend in Australia of declining smoke rates did not
dramatically change the year after the plain packaging legislation was
introduced).
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lead to a consensus about the positive effects of the legislation. The decreased
appeal of tobacco products resulting from plain packaging may have the greatest
impact on adolescents who have yet to acquire brand loyalty to a particular
cigarette or who smoke less regularly than their peers.79 Due to this lingering
doubt that plain packaging legislation is actually effective in achieving its
objective of reducing the appeal and thus the number of smokers, a court may
decide that the legislation does not satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson
test.so
The last prong of the Central Hudson test requires that the plain
packaging regulation be no more extensive than necessary to serve the
government's stated interest in passing the legislation.81 It is this prong of the
Central Hudson test that will pose the greatest challenge to the hypothetical Plain
Packaging Act. The Court has already expressed a preference for the use of
disclaimers over the suppression of speech, especially where that suppression
represents a complete prohibition.82 Therefore, it is possible that the Court would
countenance the expansion of 15 U.S.C. § 1333 rather than a new law that would
completely prohibit certain speech. For example, the requirement that the
warnings occupy ninety percent of the back of the packaging and seventy-five
percent of the front of the package could be incorporated into the current statute
which already mandates that a warning label be placed on cigarette packages
with a certain color scheme and font size.83 The ban on the use of non-word signs
is not a complete ban on speech, but it is a significant incursion on the speech. By
7 See Suzi Gage, Will Plain Packaging of Cigarettes Work? A Look at the Current
Evidence, THE GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/science/sifting-the-
evidence/2013/mar/07/plain-packaging-cigarettes-current-evidence (last
updated May 21, 2014, 12:30 AM).
80 See 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (stating that to determine whether a
governmental restriction on speech satisfies the First Amendment, it must
directly advance the governmental interest asserted).
81 Id.
82 See e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (stating that because disclosure requirements
impinge less on a speaker's interests than a complete prohibition on speech,
warnings or disclosures can be required in order to reduce the possibility of
consumer confusion or deception).
83 15 U.S.C. § 1333(2) (2012) (mandating that the text of the warning be in
seventeen point type, and be black or white on a contrasting white or black
background).
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banning the use of non-word marks on cigarette packages and strictly regulating
the font type and size of word marks, the Plain Packaging Act strives to achieve
uniformity across all cigarette packaging.8
The broad approach of the Plain Packaging Act could be perceived by
the Court as being more extensive than is necessary to achieve the government's
interest behind plain packaging. Whether or not this regulation is more extensive
than is necessary may rest on the answer to the question of whether such
uniformity in cigarette packaging is necessary to produce the desired health
benefits. The uniformity in packaging resulting from the legislation would
ensure both that the health warnings dominate the visual landscape and that the
brand image is completely diminished.85 The plain package would therefore also
have a post-sale impact as third parties would not be enticed by the package.86
The recent case of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA8' illustrates the
contentious ground that currently exists when courts are faced with government
regulations of tobacco products. In that case, tobacco companies brought a First
Amendment challenge to the FDA's promulgation of a rule requiring tobacco
companies to market cigarettes in packaging containing a graphic warning
label.86 The court found that the governmental interest as stated in the FDA rule
8 See VICTORIA PARR ET AL., GFK BLUEMOON, MARKET RESEARCH TO DETERMINE
EFFECTIVE PLAIN PACKAGING OF TOBACCO PRODucrs 21 (2011), available at
http://web.ff.cuni.cz/novyweb/utrl/files/MarketResearch-PlainPackagingof
TobaccoProducts.pdf (stating that the market research prior to the
implementation of the plain packaging legislation aimed at identifying one
plain packaging design (color, font type, font size) that would minimize
appeal and attractiveness while maximizing perceived harm).
85 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2012) (mandating that between 50% and 70% of
packaging contain warning labels).
86 See Matt Siegel, Law Spoils Tobacco's Taste, Australians Say, N.Y. TIMES (July
10, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/business/global/
law-spoils-tobaccos-taste-australians-say.html (describing how Australian
smokers were complaining after the enactment of the Plain Packaging
legislation, and arguably, according to the Prime Minister, it was the "ugly
packaging" that was making the smokers take the psychological leap to
sensing a "disgusting taste").
87 See 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
8 Id. at 1208.
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was the reduction of smoking rates, particularly in children and adolescents.89
The court, however, found that the government failed to meet its burden as the
FDA offered no evidence showing that graphic warnings on cigarette packages
"directly caused a material decrease in smoking rates" in any other country that
had adopted similar measures.90
The dissenting opinion argued that the majority applied the wrong
standard of scrutiny.91 It focused on the tobacco companies' long history of
misleading consumers92 and the governmental interest in effectively
communicating the negative health consequences of smoking to the public.93 The
dissent concluded that the government needed to only show that the graphic
warnings were reasonably related to its stated and substantial interest in
effectively conveying information to consumers and that the targeted commercial
speech presented a tendency to mislead consumers under the Zauderer
standard.94 The dissent found there was sufficient evidence demonstrating that
current warnings on cigarettes were ineffective.95 It also found that the textual
information contained in the graphic warnings was factual and that the entirety
of the warnings was reasonably related to the stated government interest of
effectively communicating the risks of smoking to consumers.96 The dissent
further opined that the majority misapplied the Central Hudson level of scrutiny.97
This misapplication occurred through the majority's failure to examine both of
the government's stated interests: (1) ensuring the accuracy of commercial
information in the marketplace; and (2) the reduction in smoking rates.98
89 Id. at 1222-23.
9 Id. at 1219.
91 Id. at 1222 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
92 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1224-25.
9 Id. at 1223.
94 Id. at 1222-23 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650-51 (1985)).
9 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1224 (citing INsTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION 5, 291 (2007)).
9 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1233.
97 Id. at 1235.
98 Id. (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995); Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993)).
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Although numerous questions remain and the evidence of the effects of
plain packaging laws on curbing tobacco use is not yet known, it is possible that
a U.S. Plain Packaging Act could survive, First Amendment scrutiny under
Central Hudson. Such legislation, however, may be found to curtail the
commercial speech rights of tobacco companies and be struck down as not
directly advancing the stated interest of the act or as being more burdensome
than necessary to achieve the stated objective of the act.
The First Amendment poses enormous obstacles when the government
attempts to regulate the advertising of tobacco products." Interestingly, tobacco
trademark owners escape similar barriers when seeking to exclude the speech of
others who use their marks under doctrines from trademark law. 00 The next
section of this article will examine this dichotomy.
C. Trademark Doctrine and Misleading Speech
The stated intent of the Lanham Act is "to regulate commerce within the
control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of
marks in such commerce."'0 The standard for what is "deceptive and
misleading," however, differs significantly from the standard applied under the
Central Hudson test. This difference opens the door for trademark owners to
bypass strict First Amendment scrutiny when seeking to enjoin others from
making commercial use of their marks.
The goal of the Lanham Act is to prevent consumer confusion as to the
source of goods and services and misrepresentation as to the nature,
characteristics, or qualities of commercial goods.102 Under trademark law, the
standard for infringement of a trademark owner's mark is a likelihood of
consumer confusion; proof of actual deception by consumers is not required.03
The Lanham Act also contains provisions addressing false advertising that make
actionable the marketing of any commercial good or service that is likely to cause
confusion as to the nature of characteristics of the good or a competitor's
9 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1205.
100 See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, supra note 49 § 23:18.
101 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
102 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1) (2012).
103 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, supra note 49, § 23:18 (stating that the standard of
finding infringement in trademark law is likelihood of confusion, even
without evidence of actual past confusion).
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goods.104 This doctrine is in complete contrast to First Amendment doctrine
described above, which requires that there be proof of actual or inherent
deception in order for speech to not receive First Amendment constitutional
protections05 Therefore a trademark owner has broad rights under the Lanham
Act to curtail the speech of others who infringe the trademark.
The application of these different standards of confusion to determine
whether use of a mark should be allowed is illustrated by considering Piazza's
Seafood World, LLC v. Odom.106 In Piazza's Seafood World, the plaintiffs sold
Chinese-farmed catfish under the trade names "Cajun Boy" and "Cajun Delight"
in violation of the Louisiana Cajun Statute, which required that any food product
that was marketed under a trade name containing the word "Cajun" be
produced, processed, or manufactured in Louisiana.107 The Fifth Circuit found
that the use of "Cajun" in this case was only potentially misleading because the
food product's packaging also indicated the actual country of origin.10s The court
held that while the government had a substantial interest in preventing
consumer deception, the statute was overbroad because there was no showing of
actual deception.109 If, however, this same case had been brought under the
Lanham Act, the USPTO could have refused registration of the trade names
"Cajun Boy" and "Cajun Delight" on the basis of potential consumer confusion.1
10
The differing outcome under these two scenarios is the result of the different
standards for false and misleading speech that have emerged under First
10 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1); 44 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3d 1, § 6 (1997) (stating that
under the Lanham Act one category of false advertising is the making of
"false representations concerning one's own goods and services, while the
second category concerns false representations of the goods or services of
another").
105 Similarly, the USPTO can refuse registration of a mark if it finds that
registration has the potential of confusing consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)
(2012).
106 448 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 2006).
107 Id. at 746-47.
108 Id. at 753.
109 See id.
110 Tushnet, supra note 66, at 751 (asserting that if the plaintiff had sought to
register the mark "Cajun Boy" with the PTO it could have been denied
registration because the examiner does not have to show actual deception to
deny registration of a mark).
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Amendment and trademark doctrines."' The practical effect of this is that few
defendants in trademark infringement cases raise First Amendment defenses,
and courts do not generally apply a constitutional analysis to trademark laws or
injunctions upon a finding of infringement.112
When First Amendment doctrine is juxtaposed with trademark law in
the context of plain packaging, divergent standards aie revealed. Were
Australia's Plain Packaging Act passed in the United States, the tobacco industry
would certainly raise a First Amendment challenge."3 This challenge would
claim speech rights in the manner in which tobacco trademarks are displayed.
Under plain packaging legislation, tobacco companies are free to use their mark
on tobacco packages, but they are prohibited from using any trade dress or
design features."4 Thus, the speech claim will be for these design elements."15
ni See Ramsey, supra note 49, at 415 (stating that upon finding trademark
infringement, most judges dismiss First Amendment concerns by making
the cursory analysis that commercial speech may be regulated when it is
false or misleading without considering whether the infringing use really
meets the First Amendment's high threshold of misleading speech). Compare
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 380, 391 (1992) (invalidating
ordinance criminalizing the use of a symbol that "arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others"), Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-19, 334 (1988)
(striking down a statute that prohibited speech critical of foreign
governments in the proximity of their embassies, while allowing favorable
speech), Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 812
(1985) ("[T]he purported concern to avoid controversy excited by particular
groups may conceal a bias against the viewpoint advanced by the excluded
speakers."), with 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (Lanham Act (L.A.) § 2(a)) (prohibiting
the registration of any trademark interpreted by the P.T.O. to be immoral,
scandalous, or disparaging, a determination which is based on whether the
public would consider the particular mark offensive).
112 Ramsey, supra note 49, at 385.
"s See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(where tobacco companies brought a First Amendment challenge to the FDA
requiring tobacco companies to market cigarettes in packets containing an
illustrated warning label).
114 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) ch 2 pt 2 (Austl) (limiting the retail
packaging of tobacco products such that any distinctive characteristics of the
product or its packaging would no longer be apparent).
"s See id.
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Interestingly, tobacco trademark owners have sought to enjoin precisely
this speech by others. When competitors use similar fonts or design elements on
their packaging, tobacco trademark owners have successfully used trademark
law as a means to restrain this speech. For instance, Philip Morris obtained a
preliminary injunction against a competitor that used a similar font, color
scheme, overall composition and crest to the well-known Marlboro cigarette
package (see Figure 2).116 Even though the competitor's product was clearly
marked with its "MidWest" brand and there were notable differences in the
packaging design, font, and crest, the Eastern District of Virginia found that there
was a likelihood of consumer confusion and enjoined the competitor's use of
these design features.17 Although the court found that consumers would confuse
the two packages, this is clearly a different standard than the actual deception
required by First Amendment law to prohibit commercial speech.118 This discord
between the two claims made by tobacco companies exposes the divergence
between trademark and First Amendment doctrines.
6 Philip Morris, Inc. v. MidWest Tobacco, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1210 (E.D.
Va. 1988).
117 Id.; accord R.J. Reynolds Tobacco v. Va. Int'l Export, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 712
(E.D. Va. 1982) (enjoining the use of design elements similar to the
packaging of Winston cigarettes even where a different trademark is
employed); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd., 180 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 592 (T.T.A.B. 1973) (concluding that cigarette packages marked with
the Rothman trademark were nonetheless likely to cause confusion with
Virginia Slims cigarettes because of packaging that each employed colored
vertical stripes).
"s See Phillip Morris Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2D 1210 (stating that actual confusion is not
required to find a violation of the Trademark Act and that a likelihood of
confusion was established, leading to a strong likelihood that plaintiffs
would prevail on the merits).
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Figure 2: Marlboro & Midwest Cigarette Packaging
III. APPLICABILITY OF FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY WHEN ENJOINING
NONCOMMERCIAL USES OF TRADEMARKS
The preceding section of this article discussed the conflict between First
Amendment and trademark law within the scope of commercial uses of tobacco
trademarks. This section will demonstrate that this same conflict exists when
trademarks are used for noncommercial purposes. This inconsistency has yet to
appear manifestly in case law, because courts rarely apply the First Amendment
strict scrutiny standard to injunctions against the noncommercial use of
trademarks."9 Within the scope of this article, the two ways in which a speech
regulation could be subjected to intermediate, and not strict scrutiny is if 1) the
119 See Ramsey, supra note 49, at 385 (stating that most courts will not apply a
constitutional analysis to trademark injunctions because they consider that
the requirement of state action is not satisfied; that certain uses of a
trademark are not speech as defined under the First Amendment; that there
is an assumption that infringing commercial use of a mark is misleading
commercial speech; or that trademark laws are content-neutral speech
regulations, not subject to strict scrutiny).
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use of the trademark is commercial or 2) the regulation is content-neutral.120 In
the instance of the noncommercial use of tobacco trademarks, neither of these
criteria for an intermediate level of scrutiny is satisfied.
To explore why, contrary to current practice, injunctions against the
noncommercial use of tobacco trademarks should be subjected to First
Amendment strict scrutiny, this section will present a hypothetical private
litigation claim between a tobacco company and an anti-smoking advertising
campaign. This hypothetical will demonstrate that most activist use of
trademarks satisfies the noncommerciality requirement and that the injunctions
issued against such activist use of marks are content-based and therefore should
be subject to the strict scrutiny First Amendment test. The last part of this section
will focus on the reasons why trademark injunctions are not currently subjected
to strict scrutiny.
A. The Archetypical Noncommercial Use of a Tobacco Trademark
"Joe Camel" was a trademark used by R.J. Reynolds to promote Camel
brand cigarettes until 1997.121 Adbusters Media Foundation is a global network of
artists, writers, students, educators, entrepreneurs, and activists who offer critical
commentary on commercial culture through the ads and articles in their
magazine and website.122 Its magazine, Adbusters, regularly features
advertisement parodies, known as "spoof ads" or "subvertisements" which use
trademarks and corporate logos to create awareness about social and political
120 It should also be noted that some arguments exist that Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act itself should be subjected to strict scrutiny as its prohibition of
the registration of any mark interpreted by the USPTO to be immoral,
scandalous or disparaging to any persons, institutions, beliefs or national
symbols mandates view-point discrimination of expressive private speech.
See generally Brief for American Civil Liberties Union & American Civil
Liberties Union of Virginia as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Pro-
Football, Inc. v. Amanda Blackhorse, No. 1:14-cv-01043-GBL-IDD (E.D. Va.)
(filed Mar. 5, 2015), available at https://www.aclu.org/free-speech/pro-
football-inc-v-blackhorse-aclu-amicus-brief.
121 R. J. Reynolds voluntarily abandoned this mark as part of an out-of court-
settlement in a case that charged the company with targeting minors with
the logo. Myron Levin, RJR Agrees to Pull Joe Camel From Ads, LA TIMES (July
11, 1997), available at http://articles.latimes.com/1997/jul/11/business/fi-11650.
122 Adbusters: About, ADBUSTERS MEDIA FOUNDATION, http://www.adbusters.org/
about/adbusters/ (last visited May 15, 2015).
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issues.123 In this vein, Adbusters created the character of "Joe Chemo" to parody
the "Joe Camel"' trademark and to raise awareness of the health issues
surrounding smoking.12 4 Joe Chemo closely resembles Joe Camel, except he is
dying of cancer.2 5 In one spoof ad, Joe Chemo is depicted lying in a hospital
bed,126 in another, walking the corridor of a hospital with an IV pole,127 and then
in a third, lying in a casket (see Figure 3).128 The Adbusters images also make use
of the same typeface found on Camel cigarette packages.129 According to the
campaign, the purpose of the adaptation is to present a "more honest" image of
smoking than that evoked by the R.J. Reynolds' Joe Camel character."30
Now imagine that Joe Chemo is used as a mascot and as a designation of
source for an anti-smoking campaign and that this organization sells Joe Chemo
t-shirts to defray the cost of the campaign."' Further imagine that R.J. Reynolds
sued the organization for infringing and diluting their trademark.132 R.J.
Reynolds could bring both a dilution by blurring and a dilution by tarnishment
123 See id.; see also David Moore, Adbusters, Poking Back at Advertisers, MEDIA LIFE
MAGAZINE (July 9, 2002), http://www.medialifemagazine.com:8080/
news2002/jul02/julO8/2_tues/news4tuesday.html (describing Adbusters'
activity as parodies of well-known ad campaigns that works by "jamming"
the existing consumer culture, allowing it to be reclaimed by civil society).
124 See Spoof Ads: Tobacco, ADBUSTERS MEDIA FOUNDATION, http://adbusters
.org/spoofads/tobacco/ (last visited May 15, 2015); More About Joe, JOE
CHEMo, http://www.joechemo.org/about.htm (last visited May 15, 2015).
125 More about Joe, supra note 124.
126 Joe Chemo - Bed (1996), ADBUSTERS MEDIA FOUNDATION, https://www.ad
busters.org/content/joe-chemo-bed (last visited May 25, 2015).
127 Joe Chemo - Hallway (1996), ADBUSTERS MEDIA FOUNDATION, https://www.ad
busters.org/content/joe-chemo-hallway (last visited May 25, 2015).
128 Joe Chemo - Funeral (1996), ADBUSTERS MEDIA FOUNDATION, https://www.ad
busters.org/content/joe-chemo-funeral (last visited May 25, 2015).
129 Id.
130 More about Joe, supra note 124.
131 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 30 (2005) [hereinafter Trademark Dilution Revision Act]
(statement of Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative Counsel, American Civil
Liberties Union) (providing hypothetical dispute).
132 Id.
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claim against the organization,133 since the suave and debonair figure promoting
Camel cigarettes is now associated with the sickly, in-need-of-treatment camel.
Since the fair use defense does not apply in cases where the defendant is using
the mark as a designation of source,"' the organization would be left to argue the
substantive claim of dilution. R.J. Reynolds would not have to prove that the
organization actually diluted the trademark, only that there is a likelihood of
dilution.135 Since the organization intended to create an association with the
famous Joe Camel mark, the factor of "[w]hether the user of the mark or trade
name intended to create an association with the famous mark" 136 Will certainly
count against it.
Or4
Figure 3: Adbusters' "Joe Chemo"
B. Commentary, Parody, Satire and the Noncommercial Use of
Trademarks
Trademark litigation between private parties is not only limited to
instances where a commercial competitor makes an unauthorized use of a
trademark owner's mark to promote his own product or service.'37 Increasingly,
groups with political, social, and environmental agendas may make
133 Id.
134 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2012).
"a- Trademark Dilution Revision Act, supra note 131.
136 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
137 See, e.g., Deere & Co v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1994)
(observing that defendant company used the plaintiff's deer logo mark in a
television advertisement for the purpose of parodying the trademark
owner).
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unauthorized uses of marks to further the goals of their organizations.' Where
the unauthorized use of another's mark has a communicative value such as to
express commentary, parody, or satire, the use of the trademark does not rise to
the level of "misleading" commercial speech regardless of whether it causes an
association with the trademark owner or not.139
Even though some of these groups produce merchandise carrying their
parodies, the mere placement of these statements on goods for sale is not per se
commercial speech and therefore the unauthorized uses of marks in this context
should be analyzed under strict scrutiny analysis.140 For example, in Riley v.
National Federation of the Blind, the Supreme Court held that where the
noncommercial nature of the speech predominates, or the commercial and
noncommercial components are inextricably intertwined, restrictions on that
expression should be evaluated under the test for fully protected expression.4 1
138 See, e.g., Radiance Found. Inc. v. Nat'l Assoc. for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), No. 14-1568, 2015 WL 2372675, at *1 (4th Cir. May
19, 2015) (where the founder of the defendant organization drafted an article
using the plaintiff's trademarked name to criticize their perceived defiance
of Christian values, perpetration of racist stereotypes and ties to Planned
Parenthood); Ramsey, supra note 49, at 397 (giving the example of politicians
who make unauthorized use of trademarked terms to convey political
ideas).
139 See, e.g., Radiance Found. Inc., 2015 WL 2372675, at *6 (stating that in
conducting the likelihood of confusion inquiry, the infringer's intent must be
taken into account, the other factors of the confusion analysis must be
evaluated in light of that intent and purpose, and that an intent to parody is
not an intent to confuse the public) (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v.
Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 261 (4th Cir. 2007)); Ramsey, supra
note 49, at 418-19.
140 See Ramsey, supra note 49, at 418-19 ("In such cases, further constitutional
scrutiny of the trademark restriction is required because the speech also
conveys useful information or ideas to consumers.").
141 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) ("But even assuming, without deciding, that such
speech in the abstract is indeed merely 'commercial,' we do not believe that
the speech retains its commercial character when it is inextricably
intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech."); see also Louis Vuitton
Malletier S.A., 507 F.3d at 261 (finding even when the primary purpose of the
satirist is commercial, an exception for parody is still operable when the
court held that the trademark of "Chewy Vuiton" toy dogs was "a comment
on the rich and famous, on the LOUIS VUITTON name and related marks,
and on conspicuous consumption in general.").
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Furthermore, in determining whether speech is commercial, courts consider
several factors: 1) whether the speech is an advertisement; 2) whether speech
refers to specific products or services; 3) whether the speaker has an economic
motivation and 4) whether the listener would perceive the speech as proposing a
transaction.142 The key to making this determination is whether a reasonable
listener could think that a commercial transaction is being proposed.143 Therefore,
as long as it could reasonably be interpreted that the social commentators' main
purpose was to relay their social message and not enter into commercial
transactions, despite the appearance of merchandise bearing their logos, their
speech under the Fourth Circuit factors would not be deemed commercial.
Trademark owners nevertheless sometimes seek to apply the Lanham
Act even where the unauthorized use of the mark is an arguably noncommercial
use.144 In these cases, the classification of the use as commercial or
noncommercial could be determinative, as federal trademark dilution law only
applies to commercial speech.145 If we were to apply this distinction between
commercial or noncommercial use of a mark to the Adbusters' Joe Chemo
campaign there is a strong argument that the use of the Joe Camel logo would be
found to be noncommercial. First, the stated goal of Adbusters' subvertisments is
to create awareness about social and political issues. Specifically, the adaptation
of the Joe Camel logo is to present a "more honest" image of smoking than that
provided by the tobacco company.146 Secondly, the sale of t-shirts is undertaken
142 Radiance Found. Inc., 2015 WL 2372675, at *13 (citing Greater Balt. Ctr. for
Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 285-86 (4th Cir.
2013)).
'43 See Radiance Found. Inc., 2015 WL 2372675, at *13 (stating that the key to
making the determination of commercial speech in that case was whether a
reasonable person reading the trademark appropriator's article would think
that the defendant was advertising a service or proposing a transaction).
4 See generally Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 312, 314 (4th Cir. 2005)
(citing People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359
(4th Cir. 2001)); Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998),
aff'd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v.
Bucci, No. 97 CIV. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 133313, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,
1997), aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998).
145 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (2012) (excluding noncommercial uses from
dilution actions).
146 More about Joe, supra note 124.
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only to defray the cost of the anti-smoking campaign.'4 7 Therefore, under Riley,
one could argue that the noncommercial nature of the speech predominates such
that "expression should be evaluated under the test for fully protected
expression."148 Under the factors approach, this outcome appears to lead to the
same result as the speech in a spoof ad; while not providing legitimate
advertisements, Adbusters has a social, rather than economic motivation for the
speech, and it would be difficult to claim that a person coming across a Joe
Chemo image would think that a commercial transaction was being proposed.
But even in infringement cases, the noncommercial use of a trademark
should be subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment, which would
almost always be fatal to the injunctions issued.149 Nevertheless, courts in many
instances only apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to these injunctions.5 0
C. The Applicability of Strict Scrutiny to Trademark Injunction as
Content-Based Regulations on Speech
While there are a multitude of reasons why courts do not subject
trademark injunctions to a First Amendment analysis, the main reason is because
these injunctions are considered to be content-neutral speech regulations. This
section will first demonstrate why trademark injunctions are in fact content-
based speech regulations before illustrating the differing level of scrutiny that
results from the two classifications and the impact this has on the
constitutionality of the injunctions issued.
147 Trademark Dilution Revision Act, supra note 131.
148 Ramsey, supra note 49, at 401 (citing Riley V. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C.,
Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)).
1 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000)
(citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)) (stating that content-based
restrictions on speech which are subject to strict scrutiny are presumptively
invalid); see also Ramsey, supra note 49, at 427-28 (asserting that when the
Court applies strict scrutiny analysis it is almost always fatal to the
regulation).
150 See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 49, at 413-15.
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1. Trademark Injunctions as Content-Based Regulations
on Speech
The main reason courts do not apply strict scrutiny to trademark
injunctions is due to the belief that trademark law is content neutral.'' Since the
injunction must reference the speech's content, however, such injunctions are in
fact content-based speech restrictions, which should be subject to strict scrutiny.
To determine whether a regulation is content-based or content-neutral,
courts look to the purpose of the regulation.152 A mere assertion that a regulation
has a content-neutral purpose is insufficient to shield it from classification as
content-based.153 Therefore, courts may also consider the substance of the
regulation to glean evidence of the government's purpose.14
Whether or not a restriction on speech is content-based depends on
whether the regulation merely regulates the medium-time, place or manner-in
which the speech is dispersed and not the content of the speech itself.1
55 Under
United States v. O'Brien56 and Ward v. Rock Against Racism,15 a regulation is
content-neutral if it does not reference the speech's content and adequate
15' Ramsey, supra note 49, at 431-32 (citing S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Committee 483 U.S. 522, 536 (1987) (holding that the prohibition of
certain uses of the word "Olympic" without authorization was
constitutional as the law passed intermediate scrutiny and was content-
neutral as the Act did not restrict the content of the message conveyed, but
only the manner in which the sponsors could identify and promote their
games)); Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that the prohibition of the Lanham Act is
content neutral); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d
1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997)) (stating that the prohibition of the Lanham Act is
content neutral and does not arouse the fears that would trigger the
application of constitutional prior restraint principles).
152 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) ("In determining whether a
regulation is content based or content neutral, we look to the purpose
behind the regulation. . . .").
153 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994).
'54 See Ramsey, supra note 49, at 430.
1ss See id. at 427.
156 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
1' 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
alternative avenues of communication exist. Determining whether the use of a
trademark is infringing requires looking at the content of the speech, unlike
consideration of true content-neutral speech restrictions such as restrictions on
sound amplification devices on trucks and laws regulating the noise levels at
concerts.'m Furthermore, the argument that trademark laws are content-neutral
because prohibiting the use of a word in registered trademark does not prohibit
the speaker's ultimate message since adequate alternative avenues of
communication exist is also problematic. The use, especially of famous marks,
serves not only to identify the source of a product, but also identifies certain
qualities and characteristics associated with that product.59 The prohibition of
the use of such a mark therefore deprives the speaker of the ability to adequately
convey his message to his audience by drawing an association between his
message and the symbolic references of the mark.160
The application of O'Brien and Ward to our hypothetical litigation cases
illustrates why trademark injunctions should be considered content-based
restrictions. In this instance, the injunction would have to look to the content of
the Adbusters image in order to make a determination of whether trademark
infringement has occurred. It would also have to reference the content of the
Adbusters image within the injunction itself as the injunction will explicitly
prohibit the use of the Joe Chemo personality-a constitutive element of the
Adbuster message. These explicit references to the content of the infringing users'
speech are steps that must be taken in every trademark infringement case. This is
why trademark regulations are unlike consideration of other content-neutral
speech restrictions.161
Furthermore, the inability to use the Joe Chemo personality would
reduce the efficacy of Adbusters' message. A poster stating "Smoking Kills" does
convey the same message to the public, but lacks the force and interest created
by the Joe Chemo character. Therefore, while alternative modes of
communication do exist, they are not of equal value. The prohibition of famous
158 Ramsey, supra note 49, at 435-36.
159 Id. at 437.
160 See Radiance Found. Inc. v. NAACP, No. 14-1568, 2015 WL 2372675, at *14
(4th Cir. May 19, 2015) ("'[lIt is often virtually impossible to refer to a
particular product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of reference
or any other such purpose without using the mark."') (quoting New Kids on
the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992)).
161 Ramsey, supra note 49, at 435-36.
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marks deprives the speaker of the ability to adequately draw an association
between his message and the symbolic references of the mark. Also, by requiring
Adbusters to use different language to convey its message to the public, the court
would be once again regulating the content of its message and not merely the
medium-time, place, or manner-in which the message is conveyed.
Despite this seemingly apparent doctrine, the jurisprudence
distinguishing content-based from content-neutral regulations is complicated
and inconsistent. Nonetheless, when analyzing speech regulations, the
determination of content neutrality is critical because the level of scrutiny
applied to the regulation determines whether or not the regulation is valid.
2. Consequences of Applying Strict Scrutiny to
Trademark Injunctions
The application of an intermediate level of scrutiny to trademark
injunctions would result in trademark injunctions withstanding a constitutional
challenge, however, as demonstrated above, if the more appropriate strict
scrutiny standard were used, most trademark injunctions would fail
constitutional review.
Content-based regulations are viewed with extreme suspicion due to
their potential to restrict expression because of its message, ideas, or subject
matter.162 For a content-based restriction to survive strict scrutiny, it must be
narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means of promoting a compelling
government interest.163 As previously mentioned, the application of this level of
scrutiny to a speech regulation is almost always fatal.16 Content-neutral
regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny as applied by O'Brien and Ward.
Under this test, the regulation is legitimate if it furthers an important or
substantial government interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, does not reference the speech's content, and the restriction is no
greater than necessary to further the legitimate government interest by leaving
open ample alternative channels of communication.165
162 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994).
163 United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
164 See supra Part II.
165 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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The application of these two different levels of scrutiny produces very
different results when applied to an injunction against the noncommercial use of
a trademark. Consider the divergent outcomes if these different standards of
scrutiny were applied to the Adbusters' hypothetical.
If a court passed down an injunction requiring Adbusters to cease use of
the Joe Chemo mark, the injunction could survive intermediate scrutiny as the
important government interest would be the protection of R.J. Reynolds' rights in
its trademark and the protection of R.J. Reynolds from being associated with an
anti-smoking campaign that it does not endorse. Also, the content of Adbusters'
message would not be hampered as there are a myriad of other methods that
Adbusters could use to communicate its anti-smoking message to the public
without making use of the tobacco company's trademarks.
The injunction, however, would most likely fail under a strict scrutiny
analysis as it is uncertain whether courts would find that there is a substantial
government interest in preventing consumer confusion regarding the
sponsorship of the use of a mark in order to provide social commentary.166
Furthermore, as strict scrutiny requires that the least restrictive means be used,
the presence of a disclaimer on Adbusters' images stating that the tobacco
company is not affiliated with Camel would be far less restrictive than the
outright banning of the use of the mark.
D. The Necessity of Finding a Way to Subject Trademark
Injunctions to Constitutional Scrutiny
While there is some validity to not subjecting trademark injunctions to a
First Amendment analysis, the creation of a corpus of jurisprudence applying
such a test or a safe harbor would lessen the opportunity for commercial
trademark owners to bypass constitutional scrutiny when seeking to enjoin
others from making noncommercial use of their marks.
Many reasons exist as to why courts would hesitate to apply a First
Amendment analysis to trademark laws and injunctions. One of these might be
because courts consider that trademark law contains built-in First Amendment
protections and does not need an additional layer of judicial oversight.167 The
166 See Ramsey, supra note 49, at 445.
167 See id. at 446 (suggesting that the Court may be governed by the logic used
in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-19 (2003), a copyright case where the
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issue of judicial efficiency must also be addressed. Currently, courts must
interpret the Lanham Act narrowly when the infringing use is part of an
expressive work.168 This requires a case-by-case contextual analysis that allows
the court to adjudicate trademark infringement cases with flexibility. It has the
substantial disadvantage, however, of lacking predictability. Therefore,
individuals and small firms who are defendants in an infringement suit will be
unable to predict the outcome of their case and will likely settle and agree to stop
using the trademark, resulting in a de facto chilling of speech.69
Issues of judicial efficiency would also exist if courts were to
automatically apply a First Amendment analysis to every injunction ordered in a
trademark infringement case.70 The inclusion of First Amendment reasoning
would allow for the creation of a body of jurisprudence that could be applied in
subsequent cases, reducing the need for every court to carry out an individual
First Amendment analysis.'71 Another solution that could resolve the conflict
between the First Amendment and trademark doctrines is the adoption of safe
harbors, either to remove certain acts from being classified as infringement or to
protect certain actors, such as internet service providers, from liability in
infringement cases.'72 The adoption of safe harbor rules would provide a degree
of predictability to trademark fair use and make it easier to dispose of meritless
cases, but would lack the flexibility of a case-by-case approach. While any of
these methods would resolve the current conflict, courts should not be allowed
to continue to bypass the issue by incorrectly characterizing trademark law as
content-neutral rather than content-based restrictions on speech.
IV. RECONCILING SPEECH AND TRADEMARKS
While the wholesale application of First Amendment doctrine to
trademark law is undesirable, courts should adopt mechanisms from other areas
of law to resolve the outstanding conflict between First Amendment and
trademark doctrines.
Court refused to impose "uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme
that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and safeguards").
168 Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
169 See Ramsey, supra note 49, at 449.
170 See id. at 452.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 456.
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The current state of trademark law encroaches on the First Amendment
first by employing a different standard for "misleading and deceptive" speech
and then by allowing injunctions against the noncommercial use of trademarks
to bypass First Amendment strict scrutiny. The current system also encroaches
on the First Amendment in another way. Trademark litigation is very costly and
unpredictable. Therefore, most noncommercial users acquiesce upon receipt of a
cease and desist letter.73 Added to this is the risk that trial courts sometimes
incorrectly apply trademark law, especially when navigating murky areas such
as the commerciality of speech. Activist defendants must then have the economic
wherewithal to sustain an appeal rather than succumb to an injunction issued at
the trial court level.174 This judicial landscape has the effect of chilling speech
protected by the First Amendment.75
The full-fledged application of First Amendment doctrine to trademark
law, however, is undesirable, as it would require a fact-intensive investigation
for each infringement case to determine if there should be liability.1 76 The burden
of showing actual confusion to prove misleading speech and removing First
Amendment protections from the defendant would be too great for most
plaintiffs to bear. If required to do so, businesses would face increased costs due
to the high degree of unpredictability in trademark litigation. The resulting
decrease in trademark infringement cases would be undesirable-the interest of
trademark law to protect consumers from confusion is a laudatory one that
should be promoted. A solution to this problem might be to establish per se tests
under which certain statements would be recognized as per se infringement and
therefore require no further proof.17 This is the approach used in defamation
law.'78 Another solution may be an explicit exclusion of the commercial use of
trademarks from constitutional scrutiny in the interest of protecting consumers.
'73 See id. at 405.
"7 See e.g., Radiance Found. Inc. v. NAACP, No. 14-1568, 2015 WL 2372675 at *2
(4th Cir. May 19, 2015) (reversing the district court's finding that defendants
had used the trademark in connection with goods and services in a manner
likely to create a likelihood of confusion).
175 Ramsey, supra note 49, at 404-05.
176 Tushnet, supra note 66, at 752 (citing Judge Richard Posner's determination
that trademark infringement is a case-specific question of fact, then rejecting
the analysis in certain situations where speech is inherently false).
17 See id. at 752-53.
178 Id. at 752.
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This is the approach the Court takes under speech regulations in antitrust,
securities, labor, and evidence law, among others.7 In these cases the Court has
found that strict scrutiny is unwarranted with little comment.'" Openly
recognizing that trademark law occupies a unique place in First Amendment
jurisprudence and structuring a framework to protect the freedom of expression
of trademark appropriators could temper trademark law's chilling effect on
speech.181
V. CONCLUSION
Tobacco products and the speech surrounding the marketing of these
products are heavily regulated in the United States, notably under the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.182 These regulations have been
routinely subject to well-funded constitutional challenges by the tobacco
industry. The statutes currently in place, however, have survived First
Amendment scrutiny as courts have determined that tobacco companies' speech
rights have only been curtailed to the extent necessary to advance the
government's stated interest in passing each legislation. Were the United States
to enact a Plain Packaging Act similar to Australia's law, the tobacco industry
would no doubt argue that the curtailment of its speech was more than necessary
to advance public health objectives.
179 Ramsey, supra note 49, at 413.
180 See id. (citing Professor Schauer for the proposition that the Court has not
explained why-for various political, economic, social, and cultural
reasons-certain areas of the law are placed outside the boundaries of the
First Amendment).
181 Id. at 384-85 (claiming that under the current regime, protected expression is
frequently chilled because the First Amendment safeguards built into
trademark law are too limited and too costly a burden for most defendants
to bear).
182 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, and 21 U.S.C.);
see e.g., Master Settlement Agreement (Nov. 1998), available at
http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/master-
settlement-agreement.pdf (limiting the advertising, marketing and
promotion of cigarettes by prohibiting advertising on outdoor, billboard and
public transit adverting and the use of tobacco trademarks on other products
and prohibiting the advertisement of tobacco products to people under the
age of 18).
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Trademark disputes are another set of issues in which tobacco
companies flex their muscles in court. In these contexts, tobacco companies often
seek to enjoin the speech of others, be they competitors who use similar fonts or
packaging designs, or parodists who ridicule their marks. Tobacco companies
vigorously protect their marks because their brands are valuable. The enormous
value attached to tobacco brands, however, is in decline as governments and
public health campaigns attack the companies' marketing strategies.
The rigorous First Amendment scrutiny that is so prevalent in tobacco
regulation disputes is simply non-existent in trademark disputes. The
juxtaposition of treatment received in actions aimed at the marketing of tobacco
products in these bodies of law reveals different legal standards in two areas of
law that are otherwise parallel. Different standards exist for the requisite level of
deception, evaluation of content neutrality, and the determination of what is
noncommercial. While tobacco regulation cases have further developed First
Amendment doctrines, the application of those doctrines to trademark law
remains unclear. The result is that speech rights in the trademark context are in a
state of disarray. As regulations tighten on the appearance of marks relating to
tobacco products, the Court may reconsider the arguments adopted in tobacco
trademark litigation and provide greater clarity regarding the First Amendment
implications of trademark law.
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